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This document was submitted to UNCITRAL Working Group III on ISDS Reform in accordance with paragraph 83
of document A/CN.9/970 (Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the work of
its 37th session (New York, 1–5 April 2019)). That paragraph, and the discussion it reflects, invited submissions by
states and other stakeholders on reform options so as to inform UNCITRAL’s efforts identifying and prioritizing
particular solutions UNCITRAL will develop in the next phase of its work. This text was drafted by Jesse Coleman,
Lise Johnson and Brooke Güven (CCSI); Lorenzo Cotula and Thierry Berger (IIED).
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Introduction
At its 37th session (New York, 1–5 April 2019), Working Group III on Investor–State Dispute Settlement
Reform (WGIII) identified participation by third parties in investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) as an
issue warranting consideration when WGIII discusses possible reform options.2 This includes
participation of the general public and of local communities that are specifically affected by the
investment or the dispute at hand, though the rationale for and scope of such participation may vary.3 A
number of points related to this issue were raised during the discussion, including:4
•
•

That third-party participation would better enable pertinent interests to be represented and
considered in the context of the dispute; and
That such participation would support consideration of other matters, including environmental
protection, protection of human rights and the obligations of investors.

During the 37th session, it was also noted that the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based
Investor-State Arbitration (‘Transparency Rules’) address amicus curiae submissions by non-disputing
third parties and non-disputing state parties.5 However, it was questioned whether the provisions
contained in the Transparency Rules are sufficient to provide for adequate consideration and protection of
third-party rights.6 In discussions during the session, several states and observers made specific comments
relevant to this topic, focusing, for instance, on concerns that ISDS proceedings can impact the rights of
third parties, and indicating that the role and intent of amicus curiae submissions are insufficient, and not
intended, to address these issues.7 Additionally, it was noted that participation of third parties—going
beyond amicus curiae submissions—is relevant for the legitimacy of the ISDS system.8
These discussions highlight the impact that ISDS may have on the rights and interests of third parties. But
they also raise issues that are integral or relevant to concerns WGIII has already identified for reform,
including concerns relating to the lack of consistency, coherence, predictability and “correctness” of
arbitral decisions; concerns relating to arbitrators and decision makers; and concerns relating to the costs
and duration of ISDS cases.9 For example, participation in a dispute, beyond the amicus curiae context,
by third parties whose rights or interests are at stake in the dispute can promote the correct interpretation
and application of all relevant legal norms and lead to more “correct” (and legitimate) outcomes. It can
also help avoid multiple and potentially conflicting decisions on relevant rights, interests and relief. A
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), ‘Report of Working Group III (InvestorState Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of its 37th Session (New York, 1–5 April 2019) (hereafter UNCITRAL,
‘37th Session Report’), paras. 31 and 39. See also IIED, CCSI and IISD, ‘Shaping the Reform Agenda: Concerns
Identified and Cross-Cutting Aspects’ (Submission to UNCITRAL Working Group III on Investor-State Dispute
Settlement Reform, 15 July 2019) (hereafter IIED, CCSI and IISD, ‘Shaping the Reform Agenda’).
3
UNCITRAL, ‘37th Session Report’ (n 2) para. 31.
4
UNCITRAL, ‘37th Session Report’ (n 2) para. 31.
5
UNCITRAL, ‘37th Session Report’ (n 2) para. 32.
6
UNCITRAL, ‘37th Session Report’ (n 2) para. 32.
7
See audio recordings of the 37th Session, covering the afternoon of 1 April 2019 and the morning of 5 April 2019.
On 5 April, relevant comments were made, for instance, by Ecuador, IIED and IISD, beginning around 90 minutes
into the English language version. Recordings are available at: <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/audio/meetings.jsp>.
8
UNCITRAL, ‘37th Session Report’ (n 2) para. 31.
9
UNCITRAL Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform) on the Work of its ThirtySixth Session (Vienna, 29 October–2 November 2018) (hereinafter UNCITRAL, ‘36th Session Report’).
2
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separate submission illustrates in greater detail some of the ways in which the cross-cutting issues
discussed by WGIII, including third-party participation, are relevant to the concerns identified for reform,
and can help shape the contours of reform options.10
Ultimately, WGIII decided that it was “important to take into account” these issues relating to third
parties as it proceeded in the next phase of its work, concerning the development of concrete reform
options.11 In light of that decision, this submission seeks to aid WGIII in its task. It first briefly highlights
the ways in which ISDS can affect the rights and interests of third parties, and how the amicus curiae
mechanism does not adequately address those issues. It then outlines potential reform options for ISDS to
better consider the range of rights and interests at stake in investment disputes. The submission provides
examples of how other legal jurisdictions address these issues. In highlighting these examples, the
submission seeks to raise questions for states to consider when thinking about how they address
analogous issues in their domestic contexts, and whether such domestic rules and principles could
helpfully inform considerations and options for ISDS reform. Finally, the submission considers what
these insights and options mean for WGIII’s work.
This submission and the options discussed complement other submissions and solutions,12 as the options
contained herein should not be interpreted as comprehensive solutions for addressing the rights of third
parties affected by investor–state disputes. It is crucial to use the opportunity presented by this United
Nations initiative to consider what means of dispute settlement is consistent with and helps advance
human rights-compliant sustainable investment and governance thereof. This may mean, for instance,
deciding that the procedural features and substantive outcomes produced by ISDS (whether through ad
hoc arbitration or a court or roster-based system) are not fit for purpose, and that the focus of reform
should be instead be on increasing support for domestic institutions, state-to-state cooperation and dispute
settlement, market mechanisms such as risk insurance, and strengthened international human rights
systems that can support access to justice for all.13 However, to the extent that reforms are more discrete
and focus on changes to ISDS models themselves, the options outlined below present some procedural
tools that could be used to better protect third parties’ rights in those proceedings. Without attention to
these issues in conjunction with other reform solutions, concerns related to such third parties will likely
remain and may in fact be exacerbated should reforms entrench the ISDS system.

IIED, CCSI and IISD, ‘Shaping the Reform Agenda’ (n 2).
WGIII agreed that, prior to developing project schedules, it is important for governments to first identify all potential
solutions for reform. With respect to such potential solutions, “it was recalled that some were listed in document
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149 and its annex. However, the Working Group agreed that other solutions could also be
proposed,” ideally by 15 July via these submissions to the Secretariat. See UNCITRAL, ‘37th Session Report’ (n 2).
12
IIED, CCSI, and IISD, ‘Shaping the Reform Agenda’ (n 2); CCSI, IIED and IISD, ‘Draft Treaty Language:
Withdrawal of Consent to Arbitrate and Termination of International Investment Agreements’ (Submission to
UNCITRAL Working Group III on Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform, 15 July 2019); CCSI, IISD and IIED
‘Draft Text Providing for Transparency and Prohibiting Certain Forms of Third-Party Funding in Investor-State
Dispute Settlement’ (Submission to UNCITRAL Working Group III on Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform, 15
July 2019).
13
Lise Johnson, Jesse Coleman, Brooke Güven, and Lisa Sachs, ‘Alternatives to Investor-State Dispute Settlement’
Working Paper (CCSI April 2019) <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2019/04/15/alternatives-to-investor-state-disputesettlement/> accessed 20 August 2019.
10
11
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How the rights or interests of third parties may be at stake in
ISDS
Investor–state disputes often affect the rights and interests of other actors that are not formally party to the
dispute. This reflects the wide range of relationships that typically arise in the context of international
investment. The factual configurations are very diverse, as are the types of actors involved. For
illustrative purposes and based on existing investor–state arbitrations, affected third parties may include:
•
•
•

•
•
•

Creditors of ISDS claimants;14
Local government bodies or indigenous authorities with rights and powers over land, contracts or
regulatory spheres that are at issue in the ISDS case;15
Local communities that are specifically affected by the investment in dispute—for example,
where the investment is a natural resource or infrastructure project that impacts those
communities, and/or where the investment is being contested by affected groups via domestic or
other processes;16
Users of utilities and other public services who are affected by measures concerning those
services or by investment claims challenging those measures;17
Individuals or groups that have competing claims to property at stake in the dispute;18 and
Adverse parties in underlying or parallel domestic litigation.19

Third-party rights or interests can be triggered or affected by ISDS disputes in a range of circumstances,
including where:

14

See e.g., Dan Cake S.A. v. Hungary, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/9, 24 August
2015.
15
See e.g., Mr. Hassan Awdi, Enterprise Business Consultants, Inc. and Alfa El Corporation v. Romania, Award,
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/13, 2 March 2015 (hereafter Awdi v. Romania) (involving a case in which the rights of
municipalities over their land was at the heart of the dispute).
16
Examples of such cases include (i) ISDS claims challenging state action taken in response to community
mobilization concerning an investment and (ii) ISDS claims challenging alleged failure of the state to act when
required to, e.g., comply with full protection and security (FPS) obligations. See e.g., Copper Mesa Mining
Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador, Award and Joint Motion for Stay of the Pending Action Pending Completion of
Settlement Agreement, PCA No. 2012-2, 15 March 2016 and 25 July 2018 (hereafter Copper Mesa v. Ecuador). For
further examples, see Lorenzo Cotula and Mika Schröder, ‘Community Perspectives in Investor-State Arbitration,’
(IIED 2017) < https://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/12603IIED.pdf> accessed 20 August 2019.
17
See e.g., Teco v. Guatemala, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/23, 19 December 2013; Suez et al. v. The Argentine
Republic, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, 30 July 2010; Azurix Corp v. The Argentine Republic,
Award, ICSID Case No ARB/01/12; 14 July 2005; SAUR International SA v. Republic of Argentina, Award, ICSID
Case No ARB/04/4, 22 May 2014.
18
See e.g., Bernhard von Pezold and Others v. Republic of Zimbabwe, Award and Decision on Annulment, ICSID
Case No. ARB/10/15, 28 July 2015 and 21 November 2018 (hereafter von Pezold v. Zimbabwe).
19
See e.g., Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, Final Award, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No.
UNCT/14/2, 16 March 2017 (hereafter Eli Lilly v. Canada); Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation
v. The Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23 (hereafter Chevron v. Ecuador).
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•

Disputes arise out of discrete competing claims advanced in different fora between nongovernmental actors, states and investors.20 For example, when an environmental organization
challenges before national courts a government agency’s issuance of an environmental permit to
an investor, and the investor brings an ISDS claim to challenge the permit’s revocation;
NGO v. Govt Agency  Investor v. State (NGO not present)

•

Disputes in which ISDS is used to challenge aspects of the legal proceedings and/or outcomes of
a dispute between the investor and other private litigants.21 For example, when individual
plaintiffs secure a tort judgment against the investment and the investor brings an ISDS claim to
challenge the tort judgment as being arbitrary and disproportionate; or when a generics firm
successfully challenges a pharmaceutical company’s patent and an investor in that pharmaceutical
company challenges the court decision in ISDS;
Tort Plaintiff v. Investment  Investor v. State (Tort Plaintiff not present)
Generics Firm v. Pharmaceutical Co  Investor v. State (Generics Firm not present)

•

Disputes before ISDS tribunals involve competing rights and interests.22 For example, where
affected communities challenge before national courts a government agency’s granting of a
concession, arguing that consultation processes were inadequate, and the investor brings an ISDS
claim to challenge a court injunction that stopped continuation of the project until consultation
was complemented); and

Affected Communities v. Ministry of Mines and Investor  Investor v. State (Affected Communities not
present)
•

Disputes in which the claimant seeks requests for relief (e.g., injunctive or declaratory) that affect
non-disputing third parties.23 For example, an indigenous community and investor have
competing claims over rights to a piece of land, and the investor sues in ISDS to secure an award
ordering the state to provide it clear title to the disputed property.
Indigenous Community v. Investor  Investor v. State (Indigenous Community not present)

It may be argued that, in ISDS disputes, the state represents the rights and interests of its citizens, and
that, therefore, concerns regarding effects on third-party rights do not arise. There is, however, a range of
circumstances applicable to the international investment context where the interests and objectives of a
respondent state and of affected third parties with discrete rights at stake may diverge, making the state
unwilling or unable to make arguments to advance the rights or interests of third parties. States may, for
instance, be unwilling to make concessions or advance arguments in ISDS that third parties could use
against them in parallel or subsequent legal proceedings concerning harms suffered by those third parties.

20

See e.g., TransCanada Corporation and TransCanada PipeLines Limited v. United States of America, ICSID Case
No. ARB/16/21; Copper Mesa v. Ecuador (n 16); and Infinito Gold Ltd. v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/5.
21
See e.g., Eli Lilly v. Canada (n 19) and Chevron v. Ecuador (n 19).
22
See e.g., Daniel Kappes and Kappes Cassiday & Associates v. Guatemala; South American Silver Limited v. Bolivia,
Award, PCA Case No. 2013-15, 22 November 2018; and von Pezold v. Zimbabwe (n 18).
23
See e.g., von Pezold v. Zimbabwe (n 18); and Chevron v. Ecuador (n 19).
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In addition, states may be unable to raise claims regarding relevant issues such as investor misconduct
and violations of third-party rights.24

Nature and limitations of the amicus curiae mechanism
Current ISDS rules tend not to provide for effective or meaningful participation of third parties in
investment disputes. Depending on applicable rules, third parties can request permission to make a
submission as amici curiae, or “friends of the court,” and an arbitral tribunal may, at its discretion, accept
such a request should certain conditions be met. However, amicus curiae submissions mainly provide the
tribunal with relevant information on points of fact or law; they are not designed to grant effective voice
or protection for actors whose rights are directly at stake in a dispute.25
Since the landmark decision in Methanex v. United States that first allowed amicus curiae submissions in
an ISDS context,26 tribunals have emphasized the limited scope of amicus curiae participation, noting
that, while the tribunal could accept written submissions from third parties, this practice conferred “no
rights, procedural or substantive, on such persons.”27 Tribunals also clarified that acceptance of amicus
submissions was “a matter of its power rather than of third party right.”28 In effect, the amicus mechanism
authorizes but does not require tribunals to accept submissions from third parties, and grants third parties
only a limited and conditional role in the proceedings. At most, amicus is a mechanism to assist the
tribunal in making its determination29 and does not enable affected third parties to meaningfully intervene
in order to protect their rights. In fact, the criteria for amicus participation—which some tribunals have
interpreted as requiring the amicus applicant to be neutral—would likely be difficult if not impossible to
satisfy for third parties whose rights are potentially affected in and by ISDS cases.
In the context of this submission, it may be useful to recall WGIII’s own clarification that “third parties”
include both the “general public,” i.e., individuals and groups who may have an interest but not a direct
stake in the dispute (hereinafter referred to, for sake of clarity, as “interested third parties”), and “local
communities affected by the investment or the dispute at hand” (hereinafter “affected third parties”).30 As
alluded to in WGIII’s discussion, there are ongoing debates regarding whether current rules and
jurisprudential approaches to amicus arrangements are appropriate to ensure adequate participation of

24

See, e.g., Chevron v Ecuador (n 19), Second Partial Award on Track II (30 August 2018), Part VII, 11-12 (holding
that the state did not have standing to raise arguments regarding claims of individual harms to Ecuadorians).
25
Lorenzo Cotula and Nicolás M Perrone, ‘Reforming Investor-State Dispute Settlement: What About Third Party
Rights?’ (IIED 2019) < https://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17638IIED.pdf> accessed 20 August 2019.
26
Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Decision of the tribunal on Petitions from Third Parties to
Intervene as “Amici Curiae,” UNCITRAL, 15 January 2001 (hereafter Methanex v. United States).
27
Methanex v. United States (n 26), Decision of the tribunal on Petitions from Third Parties to Intervene as “Amici
Curiae” [33]. For further discussion, see Farouk El-Hosseny, Civil Society in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Status
and Prospects (Brill Nijhoff 2018) 103, 105, 252.
28
United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Government of Canada, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for
Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, ICSID Case No. UNCT/02/1, 17 October 2001 [61].
29
James Harrison, ‘Human Rights Arguments in Amicus Curiae Submissions: Promoting Social Justice?’ in PierreMarie Dupuy, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and Francesco Francioni (eds) Human Rights in International Investment Law
and Arbitration (Oxford UP 2009), 405-406. See also Vivian Kube and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ‘Human Rights
Law in International Investment Arbitration’ (2016) 11 (1) AJWH 65, 88-89; Lorenzo Cotula, ‘Democracy and
International Investment Law’ (2017) 30 Leiden Journal of International Law 351, 377-380; El-Hosseny (n 27) 253.
30
UNCITRAL, ‘37th Session Report’ (n 2) para. 31.
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even interested third parties.31 But, as was also stated during the 37th session, it is clear that the amicus
curiae mechanism is not intended or suited to cater to affected third parties whose interests and legal
rights may be at stake in the dispute.
The remainder of this submission explores options to develop procedural tools that may better protect the
rights and interests of affected third parties, and that may also better serve the interests of the disputing
parties and the dispute settlement procedure itself. These include tools: (i) enabling affected third parties
to become party to the proceedings in order to ensure fair, efficient and effective resolution of the dispute;
and (ii) providing for dismissal or other reframing of the case.

Options for consideration
Many (or indeed most) domestic legal systems, and some systems of international dispute settlement,
recognize that disputes between parties to a proceeding often affect the rights and interests of others who
are not formally party to that proceeding at the outset. In recognition of this reality, procedural rules
prevalent in many legal systems provide for:
•
•
•

Participation by interested or affected third parties through intervention, joinder, or interpleader;
Dismissal of claims where such parties are unwilling or unable to intervene or be joined; and
Reframing of claims, arguments and remedies where circumstances require.

Looking to these approaches and systems can provide insights and guidance as to the rationale for each
solution, how it operates in practice, and whether and how those solutions can be considered in the
context of international investment dispute resolution. This section elaborates further on each of these
options, which could be integrated in ISDS under an arbitration or court-based system and could also
potentially be relevant for other types of proceedings, such as state-to-state dispute settlement.

For insights regarding some of the concerns regarding current amicus practice, see, e.g., Nicolette Butler, ‘NonDisputing Party Participation in ICSID Disputes: Faux Amici?’ [2019] 66 Netherlands International Law Review
143 (arguing that aspects of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes’ [ICSID’s] rules and/or
application thereof limited the potential effectiveness of amicus participation and suggesting some reforms); Damien
Charlotin, ‘ICSID Annulment Committee Allows European Commission to Intervene in an ECT Case, But Limits
Intervention to EC’s Complaint about Earlier Tribunal’s Decision to Oblige Amicus Curiae to Make Costs
Undertakings,’ IA Reporter (26 March 2019) (outlining the European Commission’s arguments that the cost
undertaking that the tribunal had ordered the amicus applicant to pay amounted to a fundamental breach of
procedure); letter by Lise Johnson, Kaitlin Cordes, and Jesse Coleman to the tribunal in Bear Creek Mining Corp v.
Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21 (3 August 2016) (raising concerns regarding the tribunal’s reasoning in its
decision to reject the amicus brief submitted by CCSI) < http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2016/08/CCSI-Repsonse-toProcedural-Order-No.-6.pdf> accessed 20 August 2019.
31
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1. Enable participation
Most jurisdictions provide for mandatory and/or permissive intervention by third parties. Examples of
jurisdictions that provide for intervention include Angola,32 Argentina,33 France,34 Germany,35 India,36
Russia,37 Senegal,38 Switzerland39 and the United States.40 Some international dispute settlement
mechanisms also provide for intervention in certain circumstances.41 For illustrative purposes only, Box 1
discusses in greater detail arrangements applicable in the United States.42 The table included in the Annex
highlights some of the rules applicable in a number of domestic, regional and international legal
systems.43

Box 1: Third-party participation in the United States
US federal laws provide a range of procedural mechanisms to protect the rights of third parties potentially
affected by disputes. The rules also aim to ensure the effectiveness, fairness and quality of the outcome
between the disputing parties, which could otherwise be undermined if, for instance, individuals or entities
are crucial to complete resolution of the case or determination of relief but are not parties to the dispute.
Relevant rules include those addressing:
•
•
•
•

Intervention by interested or affected third parties;44
Mandatory or permissive joinder by interested or affected third parties;45
Where there is a dispute or ongoing litigation amongst several parties, interpleader rules enable a
claimant or respondent to seek the participation of a third party for the purpose of determining the
third party’s rights with respect to property at issue in the claim;46 and
Dismissal of cases where a non-party’s rights will be affected by the proceedings but they cannot
be joined.47

US federal and state laws include standards and mechanisms to evaluate the level at which a third party’s
interest in a claim is sufficiently significant to warrant intervention in a dispute.48 US law and jurisprudence
32

Angola, Code of Civil Procedure.
See e.g., Argentina, Code of Civil and Commercial Proceedings.
34
See e.g., France, Code of Civil Procedure; Code Dalloz Civil Procedure; Dalloz Repertoire – Intervention; Dalloz
Action – Intervention; Dalloz Repertoire – Amicus; Judicial Organisation Code.
35
See e.g., Germany, Code of Civil Procedure.
36
India, India’s Code of Civil Procedure, First Schedule, Order I.
37
See e.g., Russia, Code of Civil Procedure.
38
See e.g., Senegal, Code of Civil Procedure. Compulsory/non-voluntary intervention developed on the basis of
judicial practice.
39
See e.g., Switzerland, Code of Civil Procedure.
40
US Federal Rules Civil Procedure, Rules 18-24.
41
See e.g., Article 62 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice; Article 31 of the Statute of the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea; and Article 10 of the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Understanding.
42
This jurisdiction was chosen because several authors are U.S. lawyers and thus particularly familiar with U.S. law.
43
The table included in the Annex is a draft. The authors welcome comments, corrections and additions to the
Annex. Please submit all proposed edits via this form.
44
US Federal Rules Civil Procedure, Rule 24.
45
US Federal Rules Civil Procedure, Rules 19, 20.
46
See e.g., US Federal Rules Civil Procedure, Rule 22; Federal Statute 28 USC § 1335.
47
See e.g., US Federal Rules Civil Procedure, Rules 19(a) and (b).
48
US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 18-24.
33
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also outline the circumstances under which such intervention is permissible or required and include
mechanisms for dismissing claims when necessary parties cannot be joined.49
US courts have extended intervention to cover public interest organizations, stating that “[a] public interest
group is entitled as a matter of right to intervene in an action challenging the legality of a measure it has
supported.”50 In other words, a public interest group involved in supporting a particular measure can
intervene in an action that seeks to challenge the legality of that particular measure. Similarly, the US courts
have stated that environmental groups who have “participated in the administrative process by submitting
comments and by appealing” a challenged measure had “easily” demonstrated an interest in litigation that
supported their right to intervention.51
US courts have also addressed the issue of whether/when the government litigant is deemed to adequately
represent or defend the rights of its nationals, and when intervention by those nationals is permissible or
required to adequately protect their rights and interests in the relevant proceeding. US courts have
concluded that: (i) the state is not assumed to represent all of its constituents’ interests, and that the same
litigation posture does not imply the same interest;52 and (ii) alignment of interests at one point in time does
not imply alignment at all stages: government policies may shift, leaving non-parties vulnerable.53 Thus,
intervention may be appropriate or even necessary to ensure that all relevant rights and interests are
protected, even with the state.

As WGIII fulfils its resolve to take into account third-party participation in the next phase of its work, and
while recognizing the specificities of each national and international legal system, the existence of legal
arrangements for third-party intervention or joinder in a large number of national and international contexts

49

ibid.
Idaho Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1397 (1995).
51
Coalition of Ariz./N.M Counties for Stable Econ. Growth v. Dep’t of Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 841 (10th Cir. 1996).
See also N.M. Off-Highway Vehicle All. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 540 F. App'x 877, 880 (10th Cir. 2013)
52
“The government’s representation of the public interest generally cannot be assumed to be identical to the individual
parochial interest of a particular member of the public merely because both entities occupy the same posture in the
litigation. In litigating on behalf of the general public, the government is obligated to consider a broad spectrum of
views, many of which may conflict with the particular interest of the would-be intervenor. ‘Even the government
cannot always adequately represent conflicting interests at the same time.’ [internal citations omitted]. This potential
conflict exists even when the government is called upon to defend against a claim which the would-be intervenor also
wishes to contest.” Utah Ass’n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246, 1255-1256. In a separate case, a US District
Court found that, in circumstances “[w]here a utility company’s case could substantially affect electrical rates charged
to consumers and small business owners” and the latter group was not adequately represented by the disputing parties
(in this case the claimant utility company and the defendant public utility commissioners), public interest groups and
the public utility commissioners “did not have coextensive interests and served different, if overlapping,
constituencies, so public interest group was allowed to intervene as of right.” PG&E v. Lynch, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1016,
53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1376 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
53
“Plaintiffs also maintain that, given the government’s past conduct in this litigation, there is nothing to indicate it
will not continue to vigorously represent the interest of the intervenors in defending the creation of the monument.
However, ‘it is not realistic to assume that the agency’s programs will remain static or unaffected by unanticipated
policy shifts.’ Kleisslerv. United States Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 974 (3d Cir. 1998). The government has taken no
position on the motion to intervene in this case. Its “silence on any intent to defend the [intervenors’] special interests
is deafening.” Conservation Law Found., 966 F.2d at 44.” Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246, 12551256, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15533, *26-27, 31 ELR 20796, 50 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 757, 2001 Colo. J.
C.A.R. 3619.
50
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provides WGIII with empirical elements to reflect on what comparable arrangements might look like in an
ISDS context.
In some jurisdictions where third parties can intervene in full and become a full-fledged party to the
proceedings, they must also bear the costs of their intervention. For some affected third parties, such as
indigenous and other communities affected by natural resource projects that give rise to ISDS disputes,
assuming the costs of intervention in ISDS may effectively bar participation, as these groups often lack the
necessary legal, technical and financial resources. This means that, if WGIII explores possible arrangements
to enable meaningful participation of affected third parties in ISDS, it should also consider rules on
allocation of costs and legal and other support facilities. Ongoing initiatives are exploring options and
mechanisms to address legal support gaps for rights holders affected by international investment.54

2. Dismiss claims
Many national legal systems recognize that it may be impossible or impractical for a third party to
intervene in a proceeding, and consequently they make provision in these cases for the dismissal or
reframing of claims that could otherwise affect third parties.55 In international law, rules regarding
dismissal are grounded in the approach the International Court of Justice (ICJ) took in the Monetary Gold
case (“Monetary Gold principle”).56 The Monetary Gold principle has been invoked by a number of states
before international and regional courts and tribunals.57
National and international legal systems also outline the factors that courts and tribunals must consider in
making their dismissal determination. Relevant considerations include:58
•
•
•
•

The extent to which the court’s determination might prejudice the third party, or the disputing
parties in the third party’s absence;
The extent to which such prejudice could be reduced or avoided by reframing the claims,
arguments or remedies;
Whether a determination rendered in the third party’s absence would be adequate; and
Whether the claimant would have an adequate remedy if the claim were dismissed due to nonjoinder of the third party.

In an ISDS context, impossibility or impracticality for a third party to intervene in the proceedings may
result from or be exacerbated by, for example:

See e.g., Sam Szoke-Burke and Kaitlin Y. Cordes, ‘Innovative Financing Solutions for Community Support in the
Context of Land Investments’ (CCSI 2019) <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2019/03/22/innovative-financing-solutions-forcommunity-support-in-the-context-of-land-investments/> accessed 20 August 2019.
55
See e.g., US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 19(b).
56
Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, UK and US) (Preliminary Question) [1954] ICJ Rep
19, 32. In Monetary Gold, the ICJ stated that it could not exercise its jurisdiction over matters when a third state’s
“legal interests would not only be affected by a decision, but would form the very subject-matter of the decision”
(Monetary Gold, 32). In reaching this conclusion, it relied on the principle of state consent to jurisdiction (see pp. 32–
33).
57
For commentary, see e.g., Ori Pomson, ‘Does the Monetary Gold Principle Apply to International Courts and
Tribunals Generally?’ [2019] 10 Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 88.
58
This example comes from the US context, and is set forth in US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 19(b).
54
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•
•
•

•
•
•

The costly and complex nature of proceedings;
Arbitration is often held in a location far from the site of the relevant investment project;
The proceedings are likely governed by substantive and procedural rules that differ from or are
less known to (and could be less favourable than) those otherwise governing the non-parties’
claims;
The arbitration may be conducted in a language other than the language of the host country or
affected third parties;
The disputing parties may not have consented to joinder by the third party; and
The instrument governing the powers of the tribunal proscribes joinder of third parties or restricts
the tribunal’s ability to take jurisdiction over arguments made by third parties.59

Thus, while intervention may serve important aims, it may not always be the right solution for relevant
disputing parties and/or third parties. Mechanical reliance on intervention, whether of a permissive or
mandatory nature, may generate concerns, including that it could force third parties to join potentially
costly and physically remote proceedings in order to protect their rights and interests, and that it could
create further barriers for those who already experience legal, financial and technical hurdles in seeking
justice for business-related harms. Rules requiring dismissal of cases would therefore be relevant to
situations where a dispute affects the rights of third parties and these parties are unable or unwilling to
join the ISDS proceedings.

3. Reframe claims, arguments and/or remedies
Where the rights of third parties may be affected but such parties cannot or will not intervene or be joined,
and the claims cannot or should not be dismissed, another approach envisaged by legal systems is for the
claims and/or requests for relief to be reframed in ways that avoid or minimize impacts on third parties.60
In an ISDS context, while investment treaties often affirm that the awards are binding on the parties only,
awards can in practice undermine proceedings and/or the outcomes of separate legal disputes between the
investor and investment-affected rights holders, or the state and those rights holders.61 Possible
arrangements for reframing the contours of an investor–state dispute may involve, for example, requiring
claimants to reformulate the claim or the legal arguments underpinning it, and/or to reshape the remedies
sought (including with regards to injunctive and declaratory remedies).

59

See, e.g., EU-Mexico Global Agreement in Principle, Resolution of Investment Disputes, art 2 (Scope) (stating that
the dispute settlement applies to disputes between a treaty Party and claimant of the other Party, arising from certain
Party obligations set forth in the treaty, and indicating that the “Tribunal constituted under this Section shall not decide
claims that fall outside the scope of this Article”); EU-Vietnam Investment Protection Agreement, ch 3 (Dispute
Settlement), art 3.27(1) and (3) (similarly cabining the types of claims that tribunals under the ISDS section can
review).
60
See e.g., US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 19(b)(2).
61
See e.g., von Pezold v. Zimbabwe (n 18). Chevron v. Ecuador (n 19), Second Partial Award on Track II, 30 August
2018 [7.36] (dismissing concerns regarding the implications of the tribunal’s award for non-parties by saying that its
decisions could not be “legally binding upon any” of those non-parties); cf. 4 Moore’s Federal Practice – Civil § 19.02
(when discussing whether a non-party is “necessary” under US rules of procedure, noting that although a non-party
may not “be bound as a legal matter by [the] judgment, as a practical matter it will probably have to sue to vindicate
its interest”).
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Ways forward
The examples discussed in this submission provide guidance for possible reform options WGIII may wish
to consider in Phase 3 of its mandate. Options include enabling participation and/or requiring dismissal or
reframing of claims. At stake is not only a concern about ensuring that the rights of third parties are
protected in comparable ways to the approaches used in many national and international legal systems but
also a concern about ensuring that ISDS dispute resolution produces fair, efficient, coherent and
consistent solutions.
Reforms could be adopted in procedural rules and treaties, including a multilateral instrument modelled
on the Mauritius Convention, which would amend existing bilateral and multilateral treaties. Procedural
tools for addressing issues of third parties’ rights could be designed to be incorporated within traditional
ISDS, as well as in the context of more encompassing multilateral reforms of the system. Some
approaches, such as clarification of the role of a Monetary Gold-type principle, could potentially be
advanced through interpretive statements or agreements clarifying existing investment treaties or aspects
of treaties governing enforcement, such as the “public policy” ground for resisting enforcement under the
New York Convention.
These and other possible approaches have advantages and disadvantages, and may involve tradeoffs
between ease of adoption and effectiveness of the solution. While an interpretive clarification, for
instance, might be relatively easy for a state to issue, its ability to shape outcomes in particular cases is
not certain. Additionally, even agreement by state parties to an investment treaty on such a clarification of
that agreement will not necessarily provide a binding outcome or a comprehensive solution to the relevant
issues. Reforming arbitral rules to provide clearer dictates to tribunals could have limited effect under
existing treaties if states or disputing parties opt to apply a different set of arbitration rules or if the
investor and state agree to modify the applicable arbitration rules. And a Mauritius Convention-type
treaty might involve relatively long time frames if ratifications are slow.
In the short term, WGIII member and observer states may wish to consider, based on their experiences,
the experiences of other states, and the experiences and insights of other stakeholders, how ISDS
intersects with the rights and interests of affected and interested third parties, and what reforms to ISDS
(which may include shifting towards other alternatives) are necessary and appropriate to ensure dispute
settlement is advancing its objectives and meeting national and international governance criteria. In this
context, states may also wish to reflect on how third-party participation issues are addressed by the legal
systems applicable in their own jurisdiction, asking such questions as: Which relevant rules apply, and
how are they working in practice? Do the issues those rules seek to address also arise in ISDS? Do the
rules provide insights for possible approaches in ISDS?
We commend WGIII for putting these issues formally on the agenda and look forward to further
discussion and engagement on these issues.
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Annex
Note: The table below is a draft. We welcome comments, corrections and additions to this draft. Please
submit all comments via this form.
Please do not rely on the information included in the table as we are continuing to develop and finalize
the annex.
Table 1: Third-Party Intervention in Common and Civil Law Jurisdictions
Jurisdiction
Angola62

Requirements for intervention
Nominated and called intervention: May
be called by the respondent to
participate as parties; requires existence
of a legal relationship between the third
party and the respondent (e.g., where the
respondent possesses assets on behalf of
the third party).
Assisting intervention: May intervene in
support of one of the parties if the third
party is party to a legal transaction
where the substance of that transaction
depends on relief sought by the party it
seeks to assist through its intervention.
Opponent intervention: The third party
has a right of its own that is
incompatible with the claimant’s claims;
it may participate upon its request or
request of the respondent.
Principal: The third party may intervene
on its own request or the request of one
of the original parties. A principal
intervener has its own rights in the
proceedings, which must either be equal
to those of the claimant or the
respondent. It may also be admitted if it
would fulfill the requirements to be
joined in the proceedings from the
outset.

62

Role of intervener
Nominated: Becomes a
respondent (with the original
either removing itself or
remaining as a party).
Assisting: Does not become a
claimant or respondent but can
invoke the same rights as the
party that it seeks to assist.
However, its position is
subordinate to the party being
assisted.
Opponent: Becomes a party to
proceedings (either as a
claimant or respondent).
Principal: Becomes a party to
the proceedings and has the
same rights as the original
parties.

Angola, Code of Civil Procedure.
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Implications for proceedings
Third parties will in most cases be bound
by the effects of any judgments rendered
by the proceedings.

Intervener’s participation is
subordinate to the party whose
position it supports.
Intervener is admitted as a joint
litigant to assert its own right
and has all powers that are
granted to disputing parties.

Argentina63

Voluntary accessory intervention: Third
parties may intervene if they prove
prima facie that the decision may affect
their own interests.
Voluntary autonomous intervention:
Third parties may intervene if,
according to substantive law, they
would have been legitimized to act as
one of the disputing parties.
Other: Some provincial codes provide
for voluntary principal intervention,
which allows third parties to bring their
own claims against both parties to
existing proceedings.

France64

Third-party intervention can be
Interveners become party to
voluntary (upon the party’s own motion) proceedings.
or compulsory (the third party is
summoned by an existing disputing
party). A voluntary intervention can be
made for the third party’s own benefit or
in support of an existing party. Thirdparty interventions must bear sufficient
links with the claims of the initial
parties.
Voluntary accessory interveners must
also show an interest in order to
preserve their rights. This “interest”
includes indirect interests.65
Voluntary principal interveners must
show that they have a right to bring an
action with regard to their claim.
Courts may summon “all interested
persons whose presence seems
necessary for the resolution of the
dispute.”66

Determinations are binding on
interveners.
Interveners must be allowed to make
observations on procedural steps already
taken.
Voluntary accessory interveners cannot be
found liable but will bear the costs of their
intervention. Voluntary principal
interveners can raise claims on their own
and can therefore be found liable.
Courts must examine and decide on the
issues put forward by interveners; they
can first decide the main claims and then
turn to third party claims if joining the two
would cause undue delay. Voluntary
principal interventions will continue even
if the main proceedings are discontinued,
i.e. they are not subordinate to the main/
original proceedings.

Germany67

Third-party intervention can be initiated
by a motion of the third party itself,
upon request of an existing party or by
summons of the court.

As intervention can run in parallel to main
proceedings, the outcomes may not be
consistent.

Third party does not become a
party in the main proceedings
but initiates a separate set of
proceedings that can be joined
into the main proceedings.

63

Interveners may intervene at any time.
The intervention does not suspend or
restart proceedings. Participation is
limited to the matters arising at the stage
at which intervention occurs.

See e.g., Argentina, Code of Civil and Commercial Proceedings.
See e.g., France, Code of Civil Procedure; Code Dalloz Civil Procedure; Dalloz Repertoire – Intervention; Dalloz
Action – Intervention; Dalloz Repertoire – Amicus; Judicial Organisation Code.
65
An organization, including civil society organizations, can have an interest in intervening if they show that (i) the
organization has a collective interest distinct from its members’ individual interests; and (ii) this collective interest is
recognized as such by law or in the organization’s statutes.
66
France, Code of Civil Procedure art 332.
67
See e.g., Germany, Code of Civil Procedure.
64
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Principal: Intervener asserts a claim on
the object or right at issue. It initiates
proceedings against both parties to the
main/original proceedings.
Accessory: Intervener has a legitimate
interest to intervene in support of one of
the parties.
Court summons: Based on the
constitutional provision that everyone
has the right to be heard, the court may
summon a third party if its decision
would affect a third party’s rights.

Intervener has the same powers In the context of accessory intervention,
the third party is more limited in the
as the original parties.
challenges it can raise.
In the context of accessory
intervention, the third party is
not a party or representative,
but can in some circumstances
be involved in the main
proceedings through joinder.

Russia68

When a third party intervenes, the case is
Third-party intervention can be initiated A third party with its own
by a motion of the third party itself or
claims has the same rights and reviewed from the beginning.
upon request of an existing party.
bears the same obligations as
existing parties.
A third party without its own
claims may join the
proceedings in support of one
of the existing parties or be
summoned by one of the parties
to participate. Such a party
bears the same procedural (but
not substantive) rights and
obligations as the party they
join.

Senegal69

Third-party intervention must be
initiated by the third party, and they
must show a substantial link with the
claim of the existing parties.
In the case of voluntary accessory
intervention, the intervener must prove
an interest in supporting one of the
parties to preserve its rights. The notion
of interest has been broadly construed
by the courts.
In the case of voluntary principal
intervention, the third party must prove
a right to bring a legal action.
In some cases, the courts may request
that the existing parties bring into the
proceedings all interested parties that
can assist in the resolution of the
dispute.

Voluntary accessory interveners
are not party to the proceedings.
Voluntary principal interveners
become party to the
proceedings.

68

Voluntary accessory interveners depend
on the fate of the main parties. They
cannot be held liable but bear the costs of
their intervention.
Voluntary principal interveners can bring
their own claims. Determinations will be
binding on voluntary principal
interveners. They can submit
arguments/pleadings.
All interveners (accessor and principal,
voluntary and non-voluntary) enjoy the
right of due process.
The courts may decide on the main
proceedings and voluntary intervention
jointly. In the case of all voluntary
intervention, if the main proceedings are
dismissed, the voluntary intervention is
also dismissed. This is not the case for
compulsory intervention (e.g.,
intervention required by the courts).

See e.g., Russia, Code of Civil Procedure.
See e.g., Senegal, Code of Civil Procedure. Compulsory/non-voluntary intervention developed on the basis of
judicial practice.
69
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Switzerland70

Third-party intervention can be initiated
by a motion of the third party itself or
upon request of an existing party.
Principal intervention is admissible
when the third party demonstrates that it
has a preferable right that wholly or
partially excludes the right of existing
parties.
Accessory intervention can be made in
support of one of the existing parties
when a sufficient legal interest in having
the dispute decided in favour of one of
the parties is proven.

Principal intervention gives rise
to independent proceedings,
wherein the intervener is
entitled to all of the procedural
rights of the existing parties.
Accessory intervention is
limited to supporting the party
it is admitted to support.

In the case of principal intervention, the
courts may join the claims and make a
single determination or stay proceedings
until third-party issues are decided.

United States71

“Intervention of right” and “permissive
intervention” are provided for.
The courts must allow for intervention
where federal statute gives the
intervener the unconditional right to
intervene or where the intervener claims
an interest relating to the property or
transaction at issue.
“Permissive intervention” enables the
courts to permit intervention where
federal statute grants a conditional right
to intervene or where an intervener has a
claim or defence that shares “a common
question of law or fact” with the main
proceedings.

The intervener becomes a party
to the proceedings. They may
join an existing party or take a
position adverse to both parties.

Interveners are generally considered to
have the same rights as the main/original
disputing parties.
Proceedings continue with the intervener
as an additional party.

70
71

See e.g., Switzerland, Code of Civil Procedure.
US Federal Rules Civil Procedure, Rules 18-24.

16

Table 2: Third-Party Intervention in International and Regional Dispute Settlement72
Jurisdiction
International Court
of Justice (ICJ)73

Requirements for intervention
State parties may intervene in
contentious matters and advisory
cases. ICJ decides upon requests
for intervention in these matters.

Role of intervener
The intervener is not considered a
party.

Where interpretation of a treaty is
at issue, a state has the right to
intervene (and the ICJ’s
determination will be binding on
it).

State parties may intervene in
contentious matters and advisory
cases concerning interpretation or
application of relevant treaties.

In contentious proceedings and
where the state intervenes
regarding the interpretation of a
treaty, the intervener will be
supplied with copies of pleadings
and documents and will be entitled
to submit a written statement
and/or written observations.
In advisory proceedings,
international organizations may
submit observations on particular
matters and in a manner
determined by the ICJ.

International organizations can
participate in advisory proceedings
as a requesting body or as bodies
likely to furnish relevant
information.
International
Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea
(ITLOS)74

Implications for proceedings

The intervener does not become a
party to proceedings.

State parties seeking to intervene in
contentious matters must seek
permission from ITLOS and, in
doing so, must set out the legal
interest they consider may be
affected by the decision in the case.

In both contentious and advisory
proceedings, the intervener is
provided with pleadings and
documents and may submit written
statements (to which disputing
state parties may respond).
Interveners may also participate in
oral hearings and make
observations regarding the subject
matter of their intervention.

State parties seeking to intervene in
advisory matters must also request
permission to do so from ITLOS.

72

In some international contexts in which third parties cannot intervene and become full-fledged parties to the
proceedings, there may be critical procedural distinctions between the proceedings. For example, regional human
rights and other mechanisms generally require exhaustion of domestic remedies as a prerequisite to accessing the
relevant forum. While third-party participation may not be available in the forum, rules requiring exhaustion may have
thus provided an opportunity for legal and factual analysis of the third party’s circumstances at the domestic level that
could form part of the factual basis of the international dispute, and potentially resolve and narrow the issues for
consideration at the international level in ways that raise fewer concerns about negative impacts on third-party rights
or the exclusionary nature of the international forum. WGIII, when considering other international examples, might
therefore wish to consider how such procedural issues could impact the analysis of affected third parties.
73
See ICJ Statute arts 62-63 (contentious matters) and art 66 (advisory cases). See also ICJ Statute arts 34 and 50 and
ICJ Rules of the Court arts 43 and 69.
74
See e.g., ITLOS Statute arts 21, 22, 31, 32. See also ITLOS Rules arts 99–104.
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Court of Justice of
the European
Union (CJEU)75

Member States of the European
Union (EU); institutions of the EU;
bodies, offices and agencies of the
EU; and “any other person.” With
the exception of EU institutions, all
others listed in art 40 of the CJEU
Statute may be granted leave to
intervene if they establish an
interest in the result of the case.
Intervention is granted by decision
of the President.

The intervener becomes an
ancillary party. They must accept
the case as they find it and support
the form of order sought by one of
the existing parties to the
proceeding.

The intervener receives procedural
documents served on disputing
parties (excluding items deemed
confidential) and may make
statements outlining the form of
order it is seeking to support, pleas
relied upon and evidence produced
or offered by the intervention.

African Court on
Human and
Peoples’ Rights
(ACtHPR)76

State parties must file a request
with the ACtHPR to intervene and,
in doing so, must show their
interest in the case. The ACtHPR
determines whether to accept the
request.

The intervener is not party to the
proceedings.

The intervening state is entitled to
present submissions regarding the
subject of its intervention.

Inter-American
Court of Human
Rights (IACtHR)77

Any person or institution unrelated
to the case and proceeding may
submit observations as amicus
curiae regarding ongoing
proceedings.

The intervener is not party to the
proceedings.

Amicus curiae briefs do not stay
the proceedings. The IACtHR has
cited and incorporated evidence
from amicus submissions and their
supporting documentation in
several judgments.

75

CJEU Statute art 40 (requirements for intervention) and CJEU Rules of Procedure arts 129–132 (procedural steps).
See e.g., ACtHPR Protocol art 5, and ACtHPR Rules of the Court arts 33 and 53.
77
See e.g., IACtHR Rules of Procedure arts 2, 28, 44.
76
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University Press 2019).
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Investment Regime on Access to Justice (Roundtable Outcome Document September 2018)
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Lorenzo Cotula and Terrence Neal, UNCITRAL Working Group III: Can Reforming Procedures
Rebalance Investor Rights and Obligations? (South Centre 2019)
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